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Justice For the Sea Turtle: 
Marine Conservation and the Court 
of International Trade 
Paul Stanton Kibel* 
I. 
INTRODUCTION: THE PLAINTIFF SURFACES 
. On April 10, 1996, the United States Court of International 
Trade (CIT) issued a landmark decision in Earth Island Institute 
v. Christopher. 1 In this case, the CIT ordered the U.S. State, 
Commerce, and Treasury Departments to block the importation 
of shrimp from all nations that had not adopted adequate policies 
to protect sea turtles.2 Worldwide, over one hundred thousand 
sea turtles are killed each year as a result of shrimp-harvesting 
operations: the turtles drown trying to escape the shrimp nets~3 
The CIT based its ruling on an interpretation of a 1989 amend-
ment to the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA), § 609.4 Sec-
* Adjunct Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law (San Francisco). 
J.D., Willamette; B.A., Colgate. The author thanks Nicole Walthall and Deborah 
Sivas (Attorneys, Conservation Law Project), Judge Thomas Aquilino (U.S. Court 
of International Trade), Todd Steiner (Director, Sea Turtle Restoration Project) and 
Steve Charnovitz (Director, Yale's Global Environment and Trade Study) for their 
comments on the first draft of this article. 
1. Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996). The 
April 1996 decision was a hearing to determine whether to grant a one-year exten-
sion to the CIT's December 1995 ruling, Earth Island Inst. v. Christoph~r, 913 F. 
Supp. 559 (Ct. In!'l Trade 1995). Thus, the December 1995 and April 1996 CIT 
decisions are really two aspects of a single litigation. To indicate their relatedness, 
and to avoid unnecessary confUSion, the two decisions are collectively referred to as 
Earth Island v. Christopher in the text of this article. 
2. See Earth Island InsL, 922 F. Supp. at 627. 
3. See id. at 624 (citing Earth Island InsL, 913 F. Supp. at 568). See also Turtles in 
the Soup, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16. 1996, at 64; see also Giant Legal Victory for Sea 
Turtles!, VIVA LA TORTUGA (Sea Thrtle Restoration Project, San Francisco, Cal.), 
Issue No. 11996, at 1 [hereinafter VIVA LA TORTUGAJ. 
4. See Earth Island InsL, 922 F. Supp. at 617 (citing Conservation of Sea ThrtIes; 
Importation of Shrimp, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 1988,1037 (1989) (to be 
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537)). Technically, the 1991 sea turtle amendments were not 
formal amendments to the Endangered Species Act (ESA), because they were 
adopted and codified as free-standing legislation. The Court ~f International Trade, 
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tion 609 created a shrimp "certification" program, wherein 
nations desiring to export shrimp to the U.S. must be certified by 
the U.S. government.5 The U.S. government can only provide 
this certification if the exporting nation can demonstrate that it 
harvests shrimp using methods that provide a level of protection 
to sea tuitles comparable to protection provided for under U.S. 
conservation laws.6 Absent proof of comparable turtle protec-
tion laws, the U.S. government is required to ban shrimp 
imports.7 
Although § 609 requires that the shrimp certification be in 
place by May 1991, U.S. agencies did not meet this deadline.8 
Instead, they adopted regulations to limit the nations to which 
§ 609 applied, and to delay the application of the certification! 
embargo provisions to these nations.9 The plaintiffs in Earth Is-
land challenged the legality of the government's limiting and de-
laying regulations, alleging that such regulations were 
inconsistent with the plain language and requirements of § 609.10 
The CIT agreed with the plaintiffs, and ordered the State, Com-
merce, and Treasury Departments to implement the certification 
and import ban programs by May 1, 1996.11 
The Earth Island litigation is significant for at least three rea-
sons. First, it establishes the CIT as the leading judicial forum, 
and most likely the exclusive trial court, for resolving legal issues 
surrounding trade-based environmental restrictions. Given the 
emerging nexus, both legally and economically, between interna-
tional trade and the environment, this jurisdictional point is 
likely to take on ever-increasing importance. Second, on the is-
sue of standing for environmental advocates, the Earth Island de-
however, concluded that because the 1991 amendments were based in part on the 
ESA listing and habitat scheme, and because the amendments furthered the policy 
objectives of the ESA, they should be treated as part of the ESA regime. See also 
infra note 30. 
5. See Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609(b). 
6. See id. § 609(b). 
7. See id. § 609(b). 
8. VIVA LA TORTUGA, supra note 3, at 2. According to Nicole Walthall, an attor-
ney for Earth Island Institute, "The Administration had thwarted the will of Con-
gress and the American people by not enforcing this law which is aimed at the global 
protection of endangered and threatened sea turtles." [d. 
9. Revised Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for 
the Protection of ThrtIes in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 58 Fed. Reg. 9,015-16, 
(1993). 
10. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616, 626 (Ct. Int'I Trade 
1996). 
11. See id. at 627. 
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cision provided an important clarification of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.12 More 
specifically, it found that the Lujan decision was not a significant 
obstacle for environmental plaintiffs seeking review of U.S. gov-
ernment actions, so long as the remedy sought was likely to fur-
ther or protect the plaintiffs' specific interests. Third, the CIT 
decision is significant for the arguments and legal principles that 
the court chose to reject. Most noteworthy was the CIT's rejec-
tion of the agencies' inadequate time and resources defense, and 
its conclusion that the shrimp certification program did not com-
promise U.S. international trade obligations. 
This article will explore the origins and likely implications of 
the CIT's ruling in Earth Island. First, it will examine the threat 
posed to sea turtles by international shrimp fishing practices, and 
the U.S. Congressional response to this threat. Next, it will sum-
marize the history and outcome of the Earth Island decision. Fi-
nally, the article will discuss the emerging conflict between § 609 
and the rules of international trade, in particular the rules estab-
lished under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.13 
II. 
SEA TURTLES UNDER THREAT: THE CONGRESSIONAL 
RESPONSE 
The population of sea turtles worldwide is threatened by de-
structive fishing practices.14 The scientific community now rec-
ognizes that several species of sea turtles are now facing possible 
extinction.15 It is estimated that over 125,000 turtles die every 
year, not to serve as food for people, but because they are hauled 
in (and drowned) as unwanted bycatch for target catch such as 
shrimp and tuna.16 As such, the sea turtles are a casualty of in-
dustrial fishing practices, of technology designed to increase the 
efficiency and decrease the expense of harvesting marketable tar-
get fish . products and seafood. 
12. 504 u.s. 553 (1992). 
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
14. See Katherine Bishop, LawsuitSeeks Ban on Shrimp Imports: Group Asks to 
Curb Nations Not Protecting Sea Turtles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,1992 at A13 [hereinaf-
ter Bishop]. 
15. See generally WEBER, CROUSE, IRWIN & IUDICELLO, DELAY AND DENIAL: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF SEA TURTLES AND SHRIMP FISHING (1995). 
16. See id. 
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According to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), a 
U.S. Commerce Department subagency responsible for imple-
menting the federal Endangered Species Act, there are currently 
at least four species of sea turtles that now face possible extinc-
tion: the loggerhead, the green leatherback, the hawksbill and 
the Kemp's ridleyP Of these species, the Kemp's ridley turtle is 
the mo&t threatened, with fewer than 1500 nesting turtles remain-
ing in the wild.18 
In terms of industrial fishing, there are two fish harvesting 
practices that have had particularly harsh impacts on sea turtles. 
The first is the use of large-scale pelagic nets. The second is the 
use of mechanized shrimp trawlers. The United States has 
played a leadership role in enacting domestic laws to reduce the 
destructive impact of these industrial fishing practices on sea 
turtles.19 
Large-scale pelagic driftnets are giant nets, sometimes ex-
tending for thirty miles and reaching forty feet in depth, that en-
trap everything that swims or drifts into their path.20 "[O]ne of 
the most deadly fishing methods ever developed,"21 driftnets, 
sometimes called "curtains of death," are now the subject of sev-
eral pieces of U.S. legislation.22 First, the U.S. has banned all 
U.S. fishing vessels (ships officially registered with the U.S.) from 
using driftnets, whether the vessels operate in U.S., international, 
or foreign waters.23 The U.S. has also adopted two laws that pro-
vide for import bans, as well as other sanctions, against the fish 
products of countries that permit the use of driftnets.24 These 
laws, the Marine Mammal Protection Act25 and the High Seas 
17. State Department Guidelines Implement Sea Turtle Decision, Int'! Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 17, at 687 (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter BNA Int'I Trade Rep.-Apr. 1996]. 
18. See TURTLE EXPERT WORKING GROUP, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SER. 
VICE, A REPORT OF THE TURTLE EXPERT WORKING GROUP: RESULTS OF A SERIES 
OF DELIBERATIONS HELD IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, JUNE 1995 - JUNE 1996 (July 2,1996). 
19. For discussion of these laws, see infra notes 20-32. 
20. See Pelagic Driftnet Fisheries 1985: Hearings Before the National Ocean Policy 
Study Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Tramp., 99th Congo 10 
(1985) (statement of William G. Gordon, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce). 
21. See LINDA PAUL, EARTI-ITRUST, HIGH SEAS DRIFTNETTING: PLUNDER OF THE 
GLOBAL COMMONS iii 0991) [hereinafter PLUNDER]. 
22. See Robert Eisenbud, Problems and Prospects for the Pelagic Driftnet, 12 B.c. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 473, 474 (1985). 
23. See Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Managment Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1857(1)(M) (1996). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1826 (1996). 
24. See infra notes 25-26. 
25. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.c.A. § 1361 (1972). 
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Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act,26 have proven effective in 
encouraging other nations and the international community to 
better respond to the environmental threats of driftnet fishing. 
More specifically, U.S. leadership helped induce the United Na-
tions General Assembly to adopt resolutions in 1989 and 1991 
calling for a global moratorium on large-scale use of driftnets on 
the high seas.27 
The lesson of the purse-seine net issue is that, in the field of 
international environmental diplomacy, the progressive policies 
of individual countries can serve as a catalyst to global awareness 
and consensus. As Hilary French, Senior Researcher at the 
WorldWatch Institute, has observed, "it is most often a unilat-
eral action by one country, sometimes backed by trade measures 
against others, that eventually spurs the international community 
to act collectively."28 These points were echoed by the Cana-
dian Environmental Law Association's Steven Shrybman: 
"[e]nvironmental progress in one jurisdiction has often created a 
'follow-the-Ieader' dynamic in which other jurisdictions are pres-
sured to conform to the higher standard."29 . 
On the issue of shrimp trawlers, U.S. regulation has focused 
primarily on mandating or encouraging the use of turtle-exclu-
sion devices (TEDs). TEDs are metal trap-doors attached to 
shrimp nets that enable turtles to escape and thereby' avoid 
drowning.3o It is estimated that TEDs can reduce sea turtle mor-
tality from shrimp fishing operations by ninety-seven percent.31 
26. High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-582, 106 Stat. 
4900 (1992). 
27. See G.A. Res. 44/225, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f) (1990), 
reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1555 (1990); G.A. Res. 46/216, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 
Agenda Item 77(e) (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 241 (1992). These U.N. resolu-
tions called for "immediate cessation of further expansion of large-scale pelagic 
driftnet fishing on the high seas of the North Pacific and all other high seas outside 
the Pacific Ocean .... " For a good discussion of the international driftnet issue, see 
Leslie A. Davis, Note, North Pacific Pelagic Driftnetting: Untangling the High Seas 
Controversy, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1057 (1991). For a discussion of how unilateral 
environmental leadership can impact international environmental consensus-build-
ing, see infra notes 27-30; . 
28. Hilary F. French, The GATT: Menace or Ally?, WORLDWATCH MAG., 14 
(Sept.lOct. 1991). 
29. Steven Shrybman, Trading Away the Environment, WORLD POLICY J. 93, 105 
(Winter 1991-92). 
30. Jane Kay, Rare Turtles Figure in Trade Pact, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 18, 1993, at 
A4. 
31. Environmentalists Win CIT Decision That Could Yield Shrimp Import Bans, 
Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Jan. 17, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Bnaevr 
File. 
62 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 15:57 
In 1987, the NMFS promulgated regulations under the federal 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) that required the entire U.S. 
shrimp fishing fleet to use TEDs.32 In 1989, Congress adopted 
legislation that took the NMFS' TED regulations one step 
further.33 
In 1989, Congress created a "certification" program to en-
courage foreign countries to upgrade their sea turtle protection 
practices and technology. The heart of the 1989 turtle protection 
program is found in § 609, which sets forth two basic require-
ments. First, § 609(a) requires the Secretary of State to initiate 
negotiations with all foreign countries to develop treaties to pro-
tect sea turtles and to report to Congress on such negotiations. 
Second, § 609(b) requires the Secretaries of State, Commerce, 
and Treasury to prohibit the importation of shrimp products 
from all countries that have failed to mandate shrimp fishing 
practices that provide sea turtle protection comparable to that 
provided under U.S. law. Although TEDs are the primary 
means to ensure comparable levels of sea turtle protection, for-
eign countries can also comply with § 609(b )'s requirements by 
demonstrating that they use other turtle-safe shrimping practices. 
One example of an alternative, non-TED, turtle-safe shrimping 
practice is requiring fishermen to manually haul in their shrimp 
nets, instead of using mechanical hauling devices.34 
The certification program is the specific method by which the 
goals of § 609(b) are achieved. The President of the United 
States, acting through the Secretary of State, must officially cer-
tify that foreign countries have adopted fishing policies that ade-
quately protect sea turtles. This certification must be supported 
by credible evidence, not merely by the unsubstantiated declara-
32. Sea Thrtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244 
(1987) . 
. 33. Pub. L. No. 101-162, Title VI § 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037-38 (1989) (codified as 
amended at 16 V.S.C.A. § 1537 (West Supp. 1996» . 
. 34. See BNA Int'l Trade Rep.-Apr. 1996, supra note 17, at 687. There i, currently 
a debate as to whether raising shrimp in aquaculture ponds'should be recognized as 
a valid shrimping practice under § 609. Although aquaculture ponds do not pose a 
direct threat to sea turtles, they are nonetheless very damaging from an environmen-
tal standpoint. Particularly in Southeast Asia, the creation of aquaculture ponds has 
often come at the expense of the destruction of natural mangrove forests. This has 
had adverse impacts on both wildlife and fish habitat. Many environmentalists 
maintain that recognizing aquaculture shrimp as "turtle-safe" under § 609's certifica-
tion program would have the unfortunate effect of encouraging the spread of envi-
ronmentally-destructive aquaculture activities. 
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tions of foreign governments.35 Without this certification, and 
the evidence to support it, t!le United States is required to block 
the importation of shrimp and shrimp products from the foreign 
country in question.36 
Although the legislation creating the turtle protection program 
was enacted in 1989, Congress postponed formal implementation 
of § 609's certification program until May 1, 1991.37 Most likely, 
Congress was aware that the administrative and economic conse-
quences of the new law might be considerable. Administratively, 
federal agencies would need time to develop more specific guide-
lines for certifying foreign countries, and for ensuring that uncer-
tified shrimp was effectively banned from importation into the 
U.S. Economically, foreign shrimp exporters committed to main-
taining access to the U.S; market might need time to bring their 
fishing practices into compliance. The delay in implementation 
provided agencies and foreign countries with reasonable time pe-
riod to anticipate and respond to the new law. 
The economic reasoning behind, and the policy objectives of, 
§ 609 were straightforward. The United States is a major pur-
chaser of shrimp. According to a 1995 U.S. Commerce Depart-
ment report, U.S. shrimp imports total more than $1.2 billion 
annually.38 Foreign nations -that export shrimp have a clear inter-
est in being able to sell their product in the lucrative U.S. market. 
By conditioning access to the U.S. market on adherence to mini-
mal sea turtle protection standards, foreign nations are en-
couraged to improve the environmental performance of their 
shrimping industry. Moreover, the import requirement creates a 
level-playing field for U.S. fishermen, who must already comply 
with the 1987 turtle protection regulations.39 
Although the language of § 609 stated that the sea turtle pro-
tection requirements applied to all countries, the State Depart-
ment promulgated regulations that limited the geographic scope 
35. Id. at 687-88. 
36. Id. at 687. 
37.Id. 
38. Ruling Seen Barring. Most Shrimp Imports to U.S., Reuters (May 3, 1996) 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires file. . 
39. VIVA LA TORTUGA, supra note 3, at 2. "US shrimpers also hailed the deci-
sion, as it 'levels the playing field' in the competitive shrimp market while protecting 
marine ecosystems." Id. "Foreign countries not using TEDs are willfully killing sea 
turtles. It's way past time that shrimpers from all countries started using TEDs in 
order to preserve our shared marine environment." Id. (quoting Jack d'Antignac, 
U.S. shrimper and President of the Georgia Fishennan's Association). 
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of this language. These regulations interpreted § 609 as applying 
only to shrimp fishing nations in the Western Atlantic/Caribbean 
region.40 The State Department justified this limited interpreta-
tion of § 609 on the grounds that Congress only intended the 
TED requirement to apply to sea turtles that are harvested in, or 
migrate through, U.S. coastal waters.41 As a result, § 609 was ini-
tially applied to only sixteen foreign "nations, fourteen of which 
were found to be non-compliant.42 
The real impetus behind the State Department's limiting regu-
lation, however, had very little to do with U.S. coastal waters or 
the migratory patterns of turtles. It had to do with the Bush and 
Clinton Administrations' interest in avoiding a high-profile inter-
national trade dispute.43 Such a dispute could potentially under-
mine the United States' credibility as a free trade advocate, and 
therefore undermine adqption and implementation of GATT and 
NAFfA.44 
III. 
THE TURTLE ON TRIAL: 
EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. CHRISTOPHER 
The environmental and marine conservation community in-
tensely criticized the State Department's decision to limit § 609's 
application to Atlantic and Caribbean shrimp fishing nations.45 
The most prominent of these critics was Earth Island Institute 
(Earth Island), a non-governmental organization based in San 
Francisco, California. Earth Island directs the Sea Turtle Resto-
ration Project, whose goal is the protection of "sea turtle popula-
tions in ways that meet the ecological needs of the sea turtles and 
the needs of local communities who share the beaches and waters 
with these endangered species."46 " 
40. See Public Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 9,015-16 (1993). 
41. See id. 
42. See David Paget & Lemuel M. Srolovic, Protecting Endangered Species: Cus-
toms Court Becomes Potent Forum, N.Y.LJ., June 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, 
Legnew Library, NYLawJ File [hereinafter Paget & Srolovic]. 
43. Judge Says Law to Save Turtles Prevents Most Imports of Shrimp, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. ~, 1996, at A9. "The issue arose during the Bush Administration when the State 
Department complained that enforcing the sea turtle law would hurt countries that 
,exported up to $3 billion worth of shrimp to the United States." Id. 
44. Stephen J. Orava, Court Decision on Shrimping Undermines U.S. Trade Policy 
WASH. LEGAL FOUN!? LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, May 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, 
Legnew Library, WLF File. 
45. See Bishop, supra note 14, at A13. 
46. SEA TURTLE RESTORATION PROJECT, VIVA LA'TORTUGA 12 (1996). 
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For many years, Earth Island has played a leading role in edu-
cating consumers, national governments, and the fishing industry 
about the threats to sea.turtles and the pressing need for TEDs.47 
The group has undertaken scientific research regarding sea tur-
tles, and political organizing to promote turtle conservation.48 
The Sea Turtle Restoration Project has established strong part-
nerships with conservation groups in Southeast Asia and Central 
America.49 Prompt and frill implementation of the turtl~ protec-
tion program's § 609 was a major policy goal for Earth Island, 
because such implementation would likely result in greater 
worldwide use of TEDs.50 The State Department's narrow inter-
pretation of the provision's geographic scope threatened to un-
dercut this goal. 
In February 1992, Earth Island filed suit in federal district 
court in San Francisco, challenging the State Department regula-
tions limiting the application of § 609.51 In its complaint, Earth 
Island asked the court for two remedies: (1) an order compelling 
the State Department to initiate negotiations regarding sea turtle 
protection with all foreign governments that export shrimp to the 
U.S.; and (2) an order compelling the State Department, as well 
as other federal agencies, to apply the shrimp certification re-
quirements to all foreign countries, regardless of geographic 10-
cation. 52' The defendants responded initially to the suit not by 
challenging the legal merits of Earth Island's claim, but by con-
tending that the federal district court lacked subject matter juris-
diction over the controversy. The State Department maintained 
that the United States Court of International Trade (Court of In-
ternational Trade), located in New York City, had exclusive juris-
diction over cases involving import and export restrictions, and 
asked that the case be dismissed.53 
The State Departmenf's subject matter argument was based on 
the Customs Court Act of 1980.54 This law was enacted to clarify 
47. Press Release of Earth Island Institute, Protest Targeted at Mexican President 
Salinas Over Slaughter of Endangered Sea Thrties, (Sept. 23, 1993) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Earth Island Press Release]. 
48. See SEA TURTLE RESTORATION PROJECT, VIVA LA TORTUGA 12 (1996). 
49. Earth Island Press Release, supra note 47. 
50.Id. 
51. Telephone Interview with Deborah Sivas and Nicole Walthall, attorneys, Con-
servation Law Project (Oct. 23, 1996). 
52.Id. 
53.Id. 
54. Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201,94 Stat. 1728 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1584 (1994). The Court's jurisdiction ex-
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the jurisdictional relationship between the United States Cus-
toms Court (Customs Court) and the federal district courts.55 
The Customs Court, established in 1926, was intended to provide 
a specialized forum for handling legal issues concerning embar-
goes and tariffs. In 1980, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of 
the Customs Court to include "new and increased responsibilities 
in the field of international trade litigation, particularly with re-
gard to antidumping and countervailing duty cases."56 
Although the 1926 and 1970 laws appeared to give the Cus-
toms Court jurisdiction over most embargo and tariff disputes, 
there remained considerable uncertainty as to whether it re-
tained exclusive jurisdiction, or merely concurrent jurisdiction 
with federal district courtS.57 This uncertainty led to a troubling 
siWation, wherein different federal district courts and federal cir-
cuits were rendering different interpretations of U.S. trade law. 
Moreover, because Customs Court decisions were not accorded a 
higher legal status than federal district court decisions, the Cus-
toms Court was unable to promote uniform application of U.S. 
trade law. This, in turn, undermined the primary reason the Cus-
toms Court was established in the first place, namely to provide 
clarity and expertise in a field of law that was becoming increas-
mgly specialized.58 Ironically, the Customs Court was spawning 
the very confusion that it was intended to curtai1.59 
The Customs Court Act of 1980 was passed to help resolve 
jurisdictional uncertainty in the area of U.S. trade law. First, the 
name of the Customs Court was changed to the Court of Interna-
tends to civil suits involving certain specified import transactions, such as classifica-
tion and valuation of merchandise, charging duties and fees on the importation of 
merchandise, the exclusion of merchandise from entry under provisions of the cus-
toms laws, the liquidation of entries, and challenges to antidumping and counter-
vailing duty cases. 
55. See generally Gregory Carman, Jurisdiction and the Court of International 
Trade: Remarks of the Honorable Gregory W. Carman at the Conference for Dispute 
Resolution on February 27-28,1992,13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 245 (1992), available 
in LEXIS, Lawrev Library, Allrev File [hereinafter Carman]. 
56. Scott H. Segal & Stephen J. Orava, Playing the Zone and Controlling the 
Board: The Emerging Jurisdictional Consensus and the Court of International Trade, 
44 AM. V.L. REv. 2393 (1995) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 
(1980» [hereinafter Playing the Zone]. 
57. Carman, supra note 55, at 247 . 
. 58. See generally Andrew P. Vance, The Unrealized Jurisdiction of 28 U.S.c. 
§1581 (i): A View From the Plaintiffs Bar, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 793 (1984). 
59. Customs Courts Act of 1980: Hearings on H.R. 6394 Before the Subcomm. on 
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Congo 
7 (1980). 
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tional Trade (CIT), to more accurately reflect the broad range of 
issues the court was charged with overseeing. Second, and more 
importantly, the law expressly expanded the jurisdiction of the 
Customs Court, and provided the court with exclusive, rather 
than merely concurrent, jurisdiction in the area of international 
embargo and tariff disputes.6o 
While the Customs Court Act of 1980 was welcomed by most 
trade lawyers and the international business community, it was 
viewed less enthusiastically by most environmental protection 
advocates. Environmentalists were skeptical about a panel of 
"trade experts" empowered to judge the appropriateness of im-
port or export restrictions related to environmental protection.61 
Given the Customs Court's specialized focus on economics and 
trade, there was concern that the judges would be ill-equipped to 
evaluate environmental issues, or that environmental policies 
would be accorded subordinate status to free trade considera-
tions.62 These concerns led environmentalists to resist efforts to 
provide the CIT with exclusive jurisdietion over conflicts relating 
to conservation-related trade restrictions. 
Environmentalists' mistrust of the CIT also grew as a result of 
a ruling by an international tribunal, established by the' General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).63 In 1991, a GATT 
dispute panel ruled that a U.S. law banning the import of tuna 
caught in driftnets violated international trade rules-.64 This rul-
ing provoked a flood of international criticism, and caused many 
environmentalists to ask whether trade-focused adjudicatory 
bodies were the appropriate forums to resolve global conserva-
tion issues.65 In the eyes of many environmentalists, the CIT was 
subject to the same shortcomings, namely pro-trade ideological 
inclinations, as the GATT.66 
60. See 126 CONGo REc. 27,063 (1980). 
61. See Playing the Zone, supra note 56, at 2426. 
62. See Daniel Magraw, NAFTA's Repurcussions: Is Green Trade Possible?, ENVI-
RONMENT, Mar. 1994 at 14, 19. 
63. See Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade: No Country Can Protect 
Its Own Smidgen of Air or Ocean, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A21. 
64. See GAIT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U. S. Restrictions on Imports 
of Thna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1598 (1991) [hereinafter GAIT Thna Report]. 
65. See Hamilton Southworth III, Comment, GATT and the Environment, 32 VA. 
J. INT'L L. 997 (1992). See also Matthew Hunter Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U.S. 
Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna! 
Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 2098 (1992). 
66. See Playing the Zone, supra note 56, at 2426. This article discussed why envi-
ronmentalists may be skeptical about the CIT: 
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Given the uncertainties of, and unfamiliarity with, the CIT's 
environmental jurisprudence, the sea turtle litigation was initi-
ated by taking what was perceived as the path of least resistance. 
In 1993 Earth Island first attempted to enforce § 609 in federal 
district court.67 In response to the State Department's conten-
tion that the CIT was the proper forum, Earth Island argued that 
a ban on imports was an environmental and not a trade barrier, 
and as such was beyond the CIT's expertise and jurisdiction.68 
The federal district court rejected Earth Island's contention, as 
did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In upholding the district 
court's dismissal, Judge Schroder of the Ninth Circuit observed 
that "embargoes are imposed for a broad range of purposes, in-
cluding public health, safety, morality, foreign affairs interests, 
law enforcement, and ecology."69 The Court found, however, 
that even if an embargo has an underlying purpose other than 
trade, that does not make it any less an embargo. Judge Schro-
der's majority opinion thus concluded that legal questions sur-
rounding § 609's shrimp embargo provisions fell squarely within 
the exclusive junsdiction of the CIT.70 
In its 1993 opinion upholding the federal district court's dis-
missal of Earth Island's .claim on subject matter jurisdiction 
grounds, the Ninth Circuit also ruled on the separation of powers 
issue. This issue .involved § 609(a), which requited the State De-
partment to initiate negotiations with foreign countries regarding 
sea turtle protection policies.71 Given that the CIT was found to 
have exclusive jurisdiction over the case, the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion to rule on the constitutionality of § 609(a) was, at least from 
a jurisdictional standpoint, somewhat unorthodox.72 This point 
The notion that trade law should be centralized has both its proponents as well as 
its opponents. In the case of centralizing authority for international trade, issues in 
a specialized tribunal, trade law purists might applaud the precision, coherence, 
and accuracy that results. Critics of the prevailing structure of the trade system, 
however, might oppose centralization on much the same grounds. For example, 
the environmental community opposed the passage of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement in part because the cloistered community of trade "experts" 
seemed to place inadequate emphasis on public participation and overarching en-
. vironmental principles. ' 
Id. 
67. Telephone Interview with Deborah Sivas and Nicole Walthall, attorneys, Con-
servation Law Project (Oct. 23, 1996). 
68. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1993). 
69. Id. at 651. 
70. See id. at 652. 
71. See id. at 652-54. 
72. See id. at 654-56. 
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was not lost on Judge Brunetti, who in a dissenting opinion 
maintained: 
Because section 609 as a whole is a "law providing for embargoes 
or other quantitative restrictions," both the claims under 609(a) 
and 609(b) arise out of it, and both claims lie within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CIT. This court is therefore without jurisdiction 
and is powerless to rule on the constitutionality of 609(a) at this 
time.73 
Writing for the majority, Judge Schroder disagreed with Judge 
Brunetti's analysis. Concluding that only § 609(b) concerned 
subject matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT, Judge 
Schroder determined that the Ninth Circuit possessed the au-
thority, and should take the opportunity, to resolve the constitu-
tional issues relating to § 609(a) at this juncture in the. 
litigation.74 In considering the issue, the majority found that 
"[t]his Court has not and cannot lawfully order the Executive to 
comply with the terms of a statute that impinges upon power ex-
clusively granted to the Executive Branch under the Constitu-
tion."75 As such, because § 609(a) intruded on the Executive's 
discretion in the field of foreign relations, the Ninth Circuit 
found the provision to be beyond the scope of judicial 
enforcement. 
As a result of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, Earth Island's only 
course of legal redress lay with the CIT. Although the prospects 
for a pro-conservation CIT decision appeared slim in 1993, a 
1995 CIT decision indicated that the court was heading in a more 
progressive environmental direction~ In Florsheim Shoe Co. v. 
United States, a U.S. importer challenged an import ban on shoes 
manufactured in Taiwan from Finnish elk skin.16 The import ban 
was based on the Pelly Amendment to the 1967 Fishermen's Pro-
tection Act, which allows the President to restrict the importa-
tion of any products from countries that engage in the 
endangered species trade.77 Although Finnish elk were not con-
sidered an endangered species, Taiwan was a major importer of 
endangered rhinoceros and tiger body parts. It was Taiwan'.s par-
ticipation in the rhinoceros and tiger trade, which is forbidden 
73. Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 656 (9th Cir. 1993) (dissenting 
opinion of Judge Brunetti). 
74. See id. at 654. 
75. Id. at 653. 
76. Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 848 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995). 
77. 22 U.S.C.A. §1978(a)(4) (West Supp. 1996). 
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under the 1972 Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), that led the 
U.S. to impose the Pelly Amendment's ban on all wildlife im-
ports from the country.78 
In Florsheim, the plaintiff argued that the Pelly Amendment 
could only be invoked if a country was trading in endangered 
species that had been taken from the wild within its own bor-
ders.79 According to the plaintiff, because Taiwan had imported 
the rhinoceros and tiger parts from other countries, the import 
ban was inappropriate and should be lifted.80 In a strongly 
worded opinion, the CIT rejected the plaintiff's interpretation 
and upheld the import ban. According to the CIT, allowing Tai-
wan to profit from the type of destructive commerce that CITES 
expressly prohibits would condone "the very mischief the Presi-
dent sought to to avert."81 
The CIT's ruling in Florsheim indicated that Earth Island's 
-prospects might not be so bleak. Given the CIT's willingness to 
aggressively enforce the Pelly Amendment and CITES, perhaps 
environmentalists' fear of institutional and ideological bias in the 
CIT had been unfounded.82 Such, at least, were the questions 
and possibilities that surfaced after the Florsheim decision. 
Thus. with the jurisdictional question finally resolved and Flor-
sheim on the books, the 1995 CIT case of Earth Island v. Christo-
pher picked up where the 1993 federal district court case of Earth 
Island v. Christopher had left off. At last, the substantive 'phase 
of the sea turtle litigation was underway. 
The government-defendants responded to Earth Island's claim 
with two basic arguments. First, they argued that Earth Island 
lacked standing to bring the suit, because the group did not have 
a legally sufficient interest in ensuring § 609's full implementa-
tion.83 Second, the government argued that the State Depart-
ment's regulation limiting the geographic scope of § 609 was a 
reasonable interpretation of the underlying legislation.84 
The government's challenge to Earth Island's standing was 
based primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court's 1992 ruling in Lu-
78. See Paget & Srolovic, supra note 42. 
79. See Florsheim, 880 F. Supp. at 850. 
80.Id. 
81. Id. at 853. 
82. See Paget & Srolovic, supra note 42. 
83. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 564-66 (Ct. InCI Trade 
1995). 
84. See id. at 567-69. 
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jan v. Defenders of Wildlife.85 In Lujan, the Supreme Court de-
nied standing to a non-governmental organization (NGO) that 
sought judicial review of U.S. government funded projects that 
were likely to injure endangered species in Egypt and Sri Lanka. 
The plaintiffs in Lujan were members of the NGO who had been 
engaged in the scientifi~ study of the endangered species 
threatened by the projects. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia 
concluded that the plaintiffs' connection to the species and the 
projects was too speculative, and that there was insufficient evi-
dence to indicate that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer "actual 
or imminent" harm to their personal interests.86 Additionally, 
Justice Scalia expressed his disdain for public interest litigation 
per se, insisting that "[v]indicating the public interest ... is the 
function of Congress and the Chief Executive."87 
If Justice Scalia's opinion was interpreted broadly, the Lujan 
decision posed a serious obstacle to public interest environmen-
tal lawsuits. Since the early 1970s, such lawsuits had played a 
critical role in improving compliance with and enforcement of 
environmental law.88 This was true for two primary reasons. 
First, environmental agencies often lacked the resources to moni-
tor and enforce environmental laws against private parties, and 
public interest lawsuits supplemented agency efforts.89 Second, 
because the government does not, or often legally cannot sue it-
self, public interest litigation is often the only means to ensure 
that the government is complying with environmental laws.90 
Lujan presented a challenge to the legal viability of such 
litigation. 
Earth Island v. Christopher provided the CIT with a high-pro-
file opportunity to help define the reach, or limits, of the Lujan 
85. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992). For an excellent discus-
sion of the decision's constitutional implications, as well as a critique of its underly-
ing analysis, see Cass Sunstein, whiu's Standing After Lujan: Of Citizen Suits, 
"Injuries", and Article Ill, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992). 
86. Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2138-39. 
87. Id. at 2145 (emphasis added). 
88. See MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CmZEN SUITS 1-2 to 1-11 (1993) 
[hereinafter AXLINE]. "Any thoughtful observer must be impressed with the level of 
government and private sector accountability that has been achieved through the 
device of the citizen suit." Id. at 1-10 to 1-11. 
89. See generally J. Henry Habicht, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: The Enforce-
ment Community's Role, 2 NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. (1987). 
90. See generally Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance with RCRA and 
Other Environmental Statutes: An Administrative Proposal, 28 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 513 (1986). 
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decision. The CIT responded with a ruling that, although still 
consistent with Lujan's analytical framework, represented a sig-
nificant departure from the spirit of Justice Scalia's 1992 opin-
ion.91 The CIT found that Earth Island had demonstrated its 
members' longstanding interest in sea turtle conservation, and 
also demonstrated that the government's failure to implement 
§ 609 presented an immediate and imminent danger to this inter-
est, and that the relief sought (full enforcement of § 609) would 
provide effective redress to the identified harm.92 The Court 
therefore held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the 
government's compliance with legislation protecting sea turtles. 
As Judge Aquilino surmised: "Suffice it to state that this court 
cannot and therefore does not find that the [plaintiffs] are within 
the realm of 'pure speculation and fantasy' here, that is, that they 
fail to show any 'perceptible harm' or to show that they are 
within the 'zone of interests to be protected by the statute' in 
question. "93 
Although they welcomed the CIT's rilling on the standing is-
sue, some environmental advocates were disappointed that Judge 
Aquilino's opinion did not undertake a more rigorous applica-
tion and more deliberate modification of Lujan.94 Such language 
would have proven extremely useful for environmental litigants. 
Nonetheless, the CIT's take on Lujan was good news not only to 
Earth Island, but to environmental advocates in general. It sug-
gested that, notwithstanding Justice Scalia's dislike (expressed in 
Lujan's dicta) of public interest litigation per se, Lujan's new 
standing requirements shoilld not present a major procedural 
hurdle for non-governmental groups seeking to ensure environ-
mental compliance through judicial review. As Nicole Walthall, 
an attorney for Earth Island, commented after the decision: 
"This case also set an important precedent on the issue of stand-
ing for environmental and conservation plaintiffs .... [T]his deci-
sion clearly establishe[d] environmental plaintiffs' right to seek 
judicial enforcement of U.S. laws ... aimed at the global protec-
tion of threatened and endangered animals."95 
91. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 566-67 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1995). 
92. See id. at 567. 
93. [d. (quoting Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport 
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 115 S.Ct. 1278, 1283 (1995)). 
94. Telephone Interview with Deborah Sivas and Nicole Walthall, attorneys, Con-
servation Law Project (Oct. 23, 1996). 
95. VIVA LA TORTUGA, supra note 3, at 2. 
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The CIT next turned its attention to the government's second 
main argument, whether the State Department's interpretation 
of § 609 limiting its application to Atlantic and Caribbean foreign 
nations was reasonable. In the 1984 case of Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council,96 the U.S. Supreme Court estab-
lished a two part test for reviewing administrative interpretations 
of law. First, the court will consider whether the meaning of the 
legislative provision in question is clear and unambiguous. If so, 
the court will adopt this clear and unambiguous meaning, regard-
less of the agency's previous interpretation.97 Second, if the leg-
islative provision is not clear and unambiguous, the court will 
uphold the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable.98 Under 
Chevron's administrative law framework, an agency's reasonable 
interpretation will be upheld even if the court, considering the 
issue de novo, might have opted for an alternative 
interpretation.99 
Employing the first prong of the administrative review meth-
odology established in Chevron, the CIT asked whether the 
underlying legislative provision, § 609, was "clear and unambigu-
OUS."lOO The CIT found that § 609's language requiring that the 
shrimp certification program be applied to all foreign countries 
was indeed clear and unambiguous.101 According to the Court, 
the meaning of the word all is plain enough. It means all, not 
some. 
The CIT therefore held that the State Department's interpre-
tation of § 609, which limited the geographic scope of the shrimp 
certification program was not the clear interpretation of § 609, 
and thus the State Department's interpretation was unreasonable 
and invalid.102 The court issued an order compelling the federal 
government to prohibit the importation of shrimp or shrimp 
products into the United States from all.foreign nations that have 
not reduced sea turtle mortality from shrimp fishing operations 
by ninety-seven percent, the level that can be achieved through 
96: 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
97. Id. at 843. 
98. Id. at 844. 
99. Id. at 845. 
100. Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F.Supp. 559, 575 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1995). 
See also CIT Hands Plaintiffs Decision That Could Result in Shrimp Embargoes, 
Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) No.3 (Jan. 17, 1993), at 73. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. at 578-79. 
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the use of TEDs.I03 Furthermore, the CIT ordered the govern-
ment to comply with the order no later th?n May 1, 1996.104 
In yet another effort to avoid compliance with the May 1,1996 
deadline, the government petitioned the CIT for a hearing to 
consider extending the compliance deadline an additional 
year. !Os In its petition, the government maintained that there 
were administrative considerations that made compliance within 
the proposed timeframe impossible. The court granted this peti-
tion, and in April 1996 held a hearing to consider the govern-
ment's request. 
At this hearing, the government's request for extension was 
denied. In a stinging opinion, CIT Judge Thomas Aquilino de-
clared that "the paucity of evidence offered in support of this 
motion enables this decision to be expeditious,"106 and that 
"§ 609's mandate to negotiate as soon as possible and to apprise 
Congress not later that one year after the date of enactment 
hardly bespeaks an additional anum of delay more than six year 
after that date."107 
Judge Aquilino further added that the evidentiary "inade-
quacy" of the government's petition might warrant sanctions 
under CIT Rule 11. This rule forbids parties from submitting 
motions primarily intended to "harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."108 Although, 
in the interest of ending the litigation, Judge Aquilino chose not 
to pursue Rule 11 sanctions, he warned that the government's 
motion for extension caused "exactly the kind of confusion which 
the rule [was] adopted to prevent. " 109 
The most recent development in the sea turtle litigation came 
in October 1996. In response to the CIT's December 1995 and 
April 1996 decisions, the State Department promulgated new 
regulations to implement the shrimp certification program.Ito 
103. See id. at 579-80. 
104. Id. at 580. 
105. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616, 618 (Ct. InCl Trade 
1996). 
106. Id. at 618. 
107. Id. at 625 (emphasis added). 
108. Id. (quoting CIT Rule 11). 
109. Id. at 626. See also Paget & Srolovic, supra note 42, at S6: "But for the 
paramount interest in ending litigation, the court stated, it would have ordered the 
defendants to show cause why they should not be sanctioned under the CIT's Rule 
11 for seeking the extension of time to comply with the law without an adequate 
basis." 
110. Public Notice, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,342 (1996). The regulation provides, in part: 
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These regulations held that a foreign country would be certified 
so long as the particular shrimp being imported into the U.S. 
were caught using turtle-safe methods.111 Under the regulations, 
foreign nations did not have to demonstrate that their entire 
shrimping fleet was turtle-safe to be certified.112 As such, the 
regulations represented yet another effort to limit the scope of 
§ 609. 
In response, Earth Island filed a motion with the CIT contend-
ing that the State Department regulations were not in conformity 
with § 609 and the December 1995 and April 1996 CIT rulings.1l3 
According to Earth Island, the State Department regulations 
"eviscerated" 114 Congress's purposes because foreign 
"[c]ountries can evade the Law's embargo by exporting to the 
United States those shrimp caught by a few designated vessels 
which are equipped with TEDs, while exporting elsewhere 
shrimp caught by those which are not."115 
The CIT agreed with the plaintiffs, and issued yet another 
strongly worded opinion against the Clinton Administration. 
Judge Aquilino held: 
They [the State Department] blame this litigation for their ap-
proach now. But the regime upon which it is based has governed 
them since May 1, 1991, and been part of the United States Code 
before then. Certainly they have had ample opportunity to pro-
pose, if not realize, legislative amelioration of what is now clearly 
perceived to be a daunting remedy. Perhaps the reason this has 
not happened is that the harm the remedy attempts to' allay has 
been equally well-understood, by both President and the 
Congress.116 
The turtle, it appeared, had at last navigated its way to victory 
in court. 
Id. 
The Department of State has detennined that, in order to achieve effective imple-
mentation of Section 609 on a world-wide basis, beginning May 1 1996 [sic], all 
shipments of shrimp and products of shrimp into the United States must be accom-
panied by a declaration ... attesting that the shrimp accompanying the declaration 
was harvested either under conditions that do not adversely affect sea turtles ... or 
in waters subject to the jurisdiction of a nation currently certified pursuant to Sec-
tion 609. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, No. 96-165, slip op. (Ct. Int'J Trade Oct. 8, 
1996). ' 
.114. Id. at 6 (quoting Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 3). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 15-16. 
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IV. 
A CONFLICT EMERGING: THE EARTH ISLAND RULING 
AND GATT 
In addition to arguments based on standing and the reasona-
.bleness of the State Department's regulations, the defendants in 
the Earth Island litigation also offered a third contention in sup-
port of their limited geographic application of § 609. This third 
contention focused on the United States' international free trade 
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).!17 According to the government, the shrimp certifica-
tion program established under § 609 conflicted with GATT's 
trade rules; therefore federal agencies, as well as the CIT, should 
interpret § 609 to minimize or avoid these conflicts.l1S 
In support of this contention, the federal government focused 
on Articles III, XI and XX of GATT. Article III states that 
GATT contracting parties may employ domestic regulations af-
fecting the import of other contracting parties, so long as these 
regulations do not discrimip.ate between foreign and domestic 
products (like-treatment principle). Article XI provides that, 
subject to certain limited exceptions, a GATT contracting nation 
shall not impose quantitative import restrictions or embargoes on 
the product of another GATT contracting party.119 Article XX 
lists the exceptions which justify a deviation from the basic free 
trade rules articulated in Articles III and XI. Among these ex-
ceptions are trade restrictions "necessary to protect human, 
animal, or plant life and health,"120 and measures "relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources."121 
To help resolve conflicts among contracting parties, the GATT 
frequently convenes dispute panels.122 Several of these quasi-ad-
117. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 579 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 
1995). "An ancillary argument, pressed by the intervenor, is that 'there are very 
serious questions relating to the consistency of [section 609] with U.S. GATT obliga-
tions.'" Id. (quoting Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenor at 44). 
118. See id. at 579. Defendants maintained that "it is appropriate to seek to mini-
mize or reduce conflict to the maximum extent possible. In this case, this means 
construing [s]ection 609 so that it affects the fewest nations and products possible, 
consistent with its basic statutory purposes." Id. (quoting Memorandum of Defend-
ant-Intervenor at 44). 
119. GATT art. XI(1). 
120. GATT art. XX(b). 
121. GATT art. XX(g). 
122. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is both an agreement 
and an organization. The organization, which is headquartered in Geneva, Switzer-
land, is charged with implementing the GATT agreement. As a result of the 1994 
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judicatory panels have considered the relation of environmental 
trade measures to GAIT's free trade requirements. The two 
most significant panel rulings concerned a Canadian restriction 
on the export of unprocessed salmon and herring,123 and a 
United States restriction on the import of tuna caught in purse-
seine nets. 
In the Canadian fish processing dispute, Canada argued that its 
processing requirement was justified under Articles XX(b) and 
XX(g). Canada maintained that the provision was closely related 
to th~ country's efforts to prevent over-fishing by ensuring that 
Canadian fishermen did not lose the value of their more limited 
catch.124 The GAIT disagreed, concluding that the processing 
requirement was not "necessary" to protect fish stocks, and that 
its primary purpose was to protect the domestic fishing industry, 
not to promote conservation.125 , 
In the tuna purse-seine controversy, discussed earlier, the 
GAIT considered a U.S. law banning the import of tuna caught 
in a manner that results in a high dolphin mortality rate.126 The 
United States offered two arguments in defense of its import re-
striction. First, it argued that the restriction did not violate Arti-
cle III, because the ban on purse-seine-tuna appli~d to both 
domestic and foreign parties. Second, the United States claimed 
that, even if the import restriction was found to violate Article 
III, it was justified under Articles XX(g)'s conservation excep-
tion. The GAIT rejected both of these arguments.127 First, it 
found that the import restriction applied to production methods 
(fishing practices), not products, and that GAIT did not permit 
production-based trade restrictions.128 Second, the panel found 
that because the restriction was "primarily aimed" at forcing 
Uruguay Round, the name of the GATT organization was changed to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). 
123. Canada Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, 
Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1989). 
124. /d. 
125. 'See generally Ted L. Mc Dorman, International Trade Law Meets Interna-
tional Fisheries Law: The Canada-U.S. Salmon and Herring Dispute, 7:4 J. Int'l Arb. 
107-21 (1990). 
126. See generally GATT Thna Report, supra note 64, at 1599. In addition to the 
1992 GATT Thna Report, there was a second GATT .dispute panel report on the 
issue in 1994. In referring to the tuna-driftnet controversy, I am referring collec-
tively the 1992 and 1994 GATT panel decisions. 
127. Id. at 1603, 1607. 
128. GATT Tuna-Dolphin II: Environmental Protection Continues to Clash With 
Free Trade (1994 Report by Center for International Environmental Law), at 2. 
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other countries to change their policies, not marine conservation, 
it did not fall within the meaning of Article XX(g).129 
There are at least three principles that appear to emerge from 
the Canadian fish processing and U.S. tuna import rulings. First, 
Article Ill's like-treatment requirement applies only to products, 
not production methods. Second, if a national conservation mea-
sure provides significant economic benefits to a national indus-
try, it may violate GATT even if it also has some pro-
environmental goals. Third, national policies that aim to force 
other countries to change their environmental policies are not 
justified under Article XX(g). 
In the Earth Island litigation, these rulings and principles pro-
vided the legal background for the defendants' contention that 
§ 609 was inconsistent with the United States' GATT obligations. 
The government argued that broad application of § 609 would 
likely prompt a formal GATT challenge, and that, under princi-
ples established in previous panel r~lings, the U.S. was likely to 
lose this challenge.13° In considering this argument, the CIT con-
ceded that it was appropriate to "seek to minimize or reduce con-
flict to the maximum extent possible ... consistent with [§ 609's] 
basic statutory purposes."l3l The CIT also stated, however, that 
"the record of enforcement of section 609 to date does not reveal 
troubling tensions with the foreign sovereigns already deemed 
covered, including those not certified positively and thus subject 
to embargoes."132 As such, the CIT seemed to suggest that 
§ 609's alleged conflict with GATT was too speculative to war-
rant limiting the application of the shrimp certification program. 
Although not addressed directly by the CIT, there may be an 
additional reason for rejecting the government's argument con-
cerning the impact of U.S. GATT obligations. Increasingly, trade 
and environmental experts have begun to question the legal 
grounds supporting the distinction between measures regulating 
products, and measures regulating production methods.133 More 
specifically, there is now considerable support for the position 
that Article Ill's like-treatment rules relating to products have 
been fundamentally misunderstood, and misapplied, by GATT 
129. [d. at 4. 
130. See Earth Island In~t. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp 559, 579 (Ct. Int'I Trade 
1995). 
131. [d. at 579 (quoting Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenor). 
132. [d. at 579. 
133. See Arden-Clarke, The Cruel Trade-Off, THE GUARDIAN (London, Sept. II, 
1991), available in LEXIS, News Library, Guardn File. 
1996] JUSTICE FOR THE SEA TURTLE 79 
dispute panels.134 Steve Charnovitz, Director or Yale's Global 
Environment and Trade Study, has provided perhaps the most 
comprehensive reassessment of Article III, and of the product/ 
production method distinction.135 
Charnovitz maintains that, at the time GATT was adopted in 
1947, there were already many longstanding examples of trade 
restrictions based on production methods relating to environ-
mental and health concerns.136 Although GATT dispute panels, 
and many trade experts, have assumed that the 1947 agreement 
sought to outlaw these existing measures, Charnovitz finds no ev-
idence to support this assumption.137 Conversely, he maintains 
that GATT actually reaffirmed the appropriateness of such pro- < 
duction-based measures, and that a '''good case can be made that 
the GATT has green rootS."138 Charnovitz thus concludes, "The 
issue is not whether process standards are acceptable as trade 
rules. That was settled decades ago. The issue is what specific 
standards are appropriate."139 
While the CIT did not find it necessary to reconsider the prod-
uct/production method distinction in Earth Island v. Christopher, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) may soon have such an 
opportunity. The WTO is th,e successor organization to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and is now charged with 
overseeing the agreement's implementation. In response to the 
CIT's April 1996 decision, many nations, including all six mem-
bers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
protested the U.S. ruling to the'WTO's Council for Trade in 
Goods.140 In July 1996, Suvit 'Khunkitti, Thailand's Agriculture 
and Cooperatives Minister, warned that if the United States does 
134. See DANIEL C. EsrY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND 
THE FUTURE 51 (1994). 
[d. 
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not ease the ban, ASEAN members will raise the issue at the 
World Trade Organization's December 1996 meeting in 
Singapore.141 
The WTO recently had its first major opportunity to consider 
the trade-environment nexus. From an environmental stand-
point, the results were not encouraging. In May 1996, the WTO 
Appellate Body, a new judicial forum created under the 1994 
Uruguay Round to the GATT, reviewed United States' Clean 
Air Act legislation concerning taxes and restrictions on the im-
port of refined gasoline.142 It concluded that the U.S. legislation 
violated GATT's trade rules.143 In its decision, the WTO Appel-
late Body criticized the United States for failing to take into ac-
count the costs the Clean Air Act provisions would place on 
foreign oil producers, and for failing to pursue "cooperative ne-
gotiations" with foreign governments before imposing the restric-
tions.l44 This ruling appears to place new hurdles in the path of 
nations seeking to defend environmental-based trade 
restrictions. 
If a formal challenge is brought before the WTO regarding the 
U.S. shrimp certification program, the CIT's resolution of the 
GATT-consistency issue will likely prove inadequate. Once a 
formal WTO challenge is filed, the "troubling tensions" that 
were absent in the CIT case will be plainly present, and the issue 
will no longer be a m<l;Uer of mere legal speculation. If events 
proceed along this path, and a WTO dispute panel is convened to 
resolve the issue, several difficult questions may arise. Should 
the WTO reject the product/production method distinction rec-
ognized in earlier panel decisions? Was the United States 
obliged to undertake a detailed analysis of the impact of foreign 
trade partners, or pursue cooperative negotiations, before ban-
ning shrimp imports? If the WTO finds § 609 inconsistent with 
international'trade rules, should the U.S. Congress amend the 
law, or should the U.S. courts reevaluate the CIT's April 1996 
decision? The answers to these questions will determine the 
course of the U.S. sea turtle.protection program. 
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CONCLUSION: PROGRESS SWIMS AHEAD 
The sea turtle is swimming into a complex and unknown fu-
ture. The CIT's ruling in Earth Island v. Christopher indicates 
that marine conservation advocates have managed to make pro-
gress on the international trade front. The CIT's decision has 
helped elevate the legal status of global conservation and envi-
ronmental protection goals. This victory, however, may be short-
lived. In addition to the emerging GAIT challenge, there have 
also been calls for Congress to amend § 609. As the Food Insti-
tute Report, an industry publication opposed to the shrimp im-
port ban, suggested, "[l]egislative relief is not to be ruled out 
either."145 These WTO .and Congressional efforts threaten to 
weaken, and perhaps overturn, the CIT's landmark decision. 
At least for now, however, the sea turtle has managed to 
achieve some degree of justice. This justice is of the most basic 
and essential nature. It is based on the right to exist, the right to 
not be driven into extinction by outdated and destructive fishing 
practices.146 As the World Trade Organization, and perhaps the 
U.S. Congress, tum their attention to the issue, this right to exist 
must not be submerged beneath the technical language that often 
dominates the trade policy arena. The fate of the sea turtle must 
remain on the surface of the debate. 
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